Reining Training Articles

Daniel Serwer: Getting to Denmark

Iraq has a state, established in accordance with a constitution adopted by referendum in October 2005. It is an Islamic federal republic, “in which the system of government is republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic.” The state is asymmetrically federal, providing a wide degree of autonomy to Kurdistan and somewhat lesser degrees to the 15 non-Kurdish governorates. The state came close to total collapse in 2003 and again in 2006-7 but has slowly recovered since. Today it manages a budget of $82.6 billion, produces oil at a rate of about 2.2 or more million barrels per day, sometimes makes a minimal basket of food available to virtually every Iraqi and produces 8000 MW of electricity. The Council of Representatives is the supreme legislative body, and there are also provincial, municipal and district councils as well as a Kurdistan parliament. The Council of Representatives has been elected twice under the current constitution, and it has twice chosen the President and Vice Presidents of the Republic as well as approving the Prime Minister and his government. Conditions are far from ideal. While violence is dramatically down from its peak in 2006/7, it has ticked up recently, as a wave of assassinations has struck security officials and politicians even as suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices continue more indiscriminate killing. The government response is not always respectful of the rule of law, and pressures to crack down hard to repress the violence are strong. The current government, formed in December 2010, is far from cohesive. It is a broad coalition that includes all the major political coalitions and commands in theory a big majority in the Council of Representatives. But the political coalitions dictated the choice of its members, the prime minister has not named key security ministers so retains those portfolios himself, and political tension is high between Prime Minister Maliki and Iyad Allawi, who head the most key partners in the coalition. Despite the formation of this “national partnership” coalition with participation from the major Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political groups, sectarian and ethnic tensions continue to plague the government. There is little sign of programmatic coherence in its deliberations, beyond general avowals of support for democracy and human rights. With some exceptions, the ministers seem more committed to protecting their own party, sectarian and ethnic interests than to providing Iraq’s citizens with the kind of good governance many of them would like. This makes Iraq an oil rentier state with no need to convince citizens of the value of the services it provides in order to obtain revenue. While Revenue Watch has ranked Iraq ahead of other Middle Eastern oil producers in revenue transparency, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index used foreigners’ perceptions to rank Iraq towards the bottom end in “abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq has moved a long way. Its constitution is now broadly accepted by all but a relative handful of Sunni insurgents. Its politics, while still organized mainly around sect and ethnicity, have developed in directions that often cross ethnic and sectarian boundaries at the national, provincial and local levels. There have been moments when it appeared that major politicians like Allawi—a secular Shiite who leads a virtually all-Sunni political coalition—or even Maliki might successfully form a more coherent, cross-sectarian national political movement. The Arab Spring brought to Iraq a significant increase in citizen demands for improved services and a fuller realization of democratic ideals. Prime Minister Maliki announced he would not seek a third mandate even before the protests hit Iraq. Maliki also set a 100-day deadline, which expired June 9, for improved performance by his ministers. Little progress in either word or deed was evident, pro-government thugs and security forces have attacked pro-democracy demonstrators, and the government seems to have missed the opportunity to use discontent to accelerate its efforts to improve performance in service delivery and reduce corruption and other abuses. The handling of its oil revenue is a critical issue for Iraq’s future as a democratic state. Oil production is expanding now that the government has entered into agreements with international oil companies. If oil prices remain around $100 per barrel, the Iraqi state will be collecting far more revenue than its current spending plans, or any reasonable future ones, require. Baghdad has many choices, but the fundamental one is this: will all the new revenue go to the state, to dispose of as politicians decide, or will at least some of it go to the Iraqi people, to use as they see fit? If the latter, one can envisage an Iraq where the state has to meet the burden of convincing citizens to provide revenue, political parties consequently begin to organize around issues rather than sectarian or ethnic protection, civil society continues to develop even with reduced international support, and media become more independent. This would be a polycentric Iraq, one more closely resembling modern Western democracies and likely to align itself with the West against autocracy and Iranian efforts to establish hegemony in the Middle East. Even if the Iraqi government holds on to the lion’s share of oil revenue, there remains the question of how wisely it is used and whether there will be transparency and accountability, not only for revenue but also for expenditures. The importance of reining in corruption is generally acknowledged in Iraq today. If Iraq can reduce the well-known abuses that plague its public sector, the country would become a far more attractive place for non-oil investment. Iraq is geographically advantaged when it comes to exporting oil and gas. In the past, the lion’s share of oil has been exported through the Gulf. But some oil produced in Kurdistan is already exported to the north, and it is not beyond Iraq’s means to greatly expand its capacity to export economically to both the north and west, through Turkey, Syria or Jordan. Iraqi gas, still mostly undeveloped, could also go in these directions. The most immediate threat to Iraq’s democratic development is resurgent violence that causes the state to crack down hard and in doing so returns the country to arbitrary and potentially autocratic rule. While it is difficult to imagine the restoration of the Republic of Fear, it is relatively easy to imagine de facto autocrats, or more likely small groups of kleptocrats, gaining control over their own ethnic or sectarian groups. This is already apparent in Kurdistan, and Maliki is gradually gaining hegemonic control over large parts of the Shia south. No single hegemon has yet emerged in Sunni-majority areas. Prime Minister Maliki, who currently holds the defense, interior and national security portfolios, has done a great deal to strengthen his position over the past five years. He seems willing to go farther in this direction. He has assembled strong, extra-constitutional counter-terrorism and intelligence forces that report directly to him, he has installed army commanders on an interim basis without parliamentary approval, he has obtained a decision from the Supreme Court giving the executive branch some power over the central bank and election commission, and the Supreme Court has also ruled that only the executive can initiate “legislative projects.” This concentration of power generates fear that democratic development may be blocked. Arab/Kurdish tensions could cause serious problems as well. Kurdish claims to the so-called “disputed territories” are being met with strong Arab resistance. While there are rational—even easy—solutions to many of the problems, Kirkuk city and province represent a seemingly intractable quandary. While there is a great deal to be gained economically from maintaining the peace, it is not yet clear that after American withdrawal at the end of the year Arabs and Kurds will be willing and able to maintain stability there as they work towards a settlement. Even if intentions are good, miscalculation is possible. Control over oil production and revenue are also sources of Kurdish/Arab tension, but they are increasingly viewed as parts of the solution as well. Iran will seek to expand its influence as the Americans draw down. While they would have many legitimate ways of doing this in a democratic Iraq, they may prefer to avoid that paradigm on their borders. They may also want, once Ayatollah Sistani is out of the way, to see Iraq turn in a theocratic, or at least a more Islamist, direction. Iran will use Sadrist and other political and militia groups to counter Saudi and US influence, encourage maximum US withdrawal and ensure that Islamist Shiites remain dominant in Iraq. Risks exist from other neighbors as well. The Syrian Ba’ath Party and the Iraqi one never got on well, but Damascus will not want a successful democracy on its borders. It may continue to allow the export of at least a minimal flow of insurgents into Iraq, especially if Iraq is less than fully supportive of the Syrian regime’s crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations. Saudi Arabia will seek to ensure that a democratic Iraq is one in which Sunnis have a voice larger than their numbers in the population. Turkey will want to ensure that Iraqi Kurdistan does its best to limit haven for the PKK or other insurgent Kurds, something it has achieved in recent years by establishing excellent economic and political relations with Erbil. But if Turkey were to return to military incursions into Iraq, that could undermine the development of a more democratic Kurdistan. A limited US contingent, for training and counterterrorism, may remain in Iraq after the end of 2011. Whether the contingent is 10,000 or 20,000 does not make an enormous difference to maintenance of Iraq’s democracy (it may however make a big difference to the military balance with Iran). What really counts for democracy is that the US continue to have a good rapport with the Iraqi officer corps, whose training in US military schools is vital to maintaining the kind of professionalism and civilian oversight that will permit democratic evolution to continue. Just as important will be continuing American rapport with the Iraqi people in general, with civil society organizations, and with key institutions of the Iraqi government, including not only the executive branch but also the Council of Representatives and the judiciary. This is normal diplomatic work, encouraged by the Strategic Framework agreement, but it needs to be on steroids in Iraq, where we will be trying to counterbalance not only the weight of Iraqi history and the weakness of its institutions but also the considerable weight of its non-democratic neighbors in order to protect an enormous American investment of lives and money. Let me offer a couple of examples. I have been involved for years in supporting a dialogue among Iraq parliamentarians concerned with national reconciliation. They have now decided to institutionalize their efforts in a parliamentary caucus. We could walk away at the end of the year and say it is now all in Iraqi hands. But I hope we will continue to support this and other comparable efforts aimed at overcoming sectarian and ethnic divides. Likewise, I hope we will continue to provide support to the Iraqi judicial system, especially the Supreme Court, as well as the election commission. The Court has played a critical role in strengthening the prime minister’s powers and will have to play an equally critical role if those powers are to be limited in meaningful ways. Likewise the election commission is a vital piece of democratic machinery that should not be left to fend for itself. Nor should we abandon women’s advocacy organizations. A fifth but important example arises from Iraq’s oil exports. Today the bulk leaves Iraq through the Gulf, where it runs an Iranian gauntlet. Only a small amount is exported to Turkey from Kurdistan. Fixing the “strategic” pipeline, which links northern and southern Iraq, would enable Iraq to export even oil produced in the south through the north. Getting the Iraqis to do this should be a top priority for the US So, too, should be development of Iraqi gas for transport to Europe through the Nabucco pipeline. Last but not least, automatic distribution of at least some oil revenue on a per capita basis would give citizens a more direct stake in Iraq’s success. This would begin to change the relationship between the citizen and the state, empowering the former and giving the latter more incentive to provide improved services. Current levels of state revenue are sufficient to provide payments to citizens, which would require a strict system of accountability and transparency. Ultimately, whether Iraq continues to develop as a democracy or lapses into something more like its unfortunate past depends on the Iraqis themselves. They seem ambivalent. Some of them, at least on some days, appreciate the freedom they enjoy today, which far exceeds the norm in the Middle East as well as Iraq’s own past. They want more democracy, not less, as recent street protests have demonstrated. Others, or maybe the same people on other days, are impatient with democratic processes and cry out for “action”—someone who will fix all that ails the country without bothering to consult, legislate or show respect for human rights. Any serious effort to restore autocracy in the whole country would be met with dramatic opposition, most likely organized on an ethnic or sectarian basis.

Horses Do Not Have Buttons » Todd Martin Performance Horses

Have you ever heard someone say that they just have not learned what buttons to push on their horse to get a certain maneuver. Well I do, I hear it all the time. In fact I heard it again the other day when being told by someone that their horse had a bunch of buttons that they just needed to learn how to push them. Well, where I come from, pushing someones’ buttons is not a good thing. Ok so I am going to say it again, for the love of Pete, horses do not have buttons! I think it would be more aptly put that what these people are trying to say is “they do not know the basics”.

We hear and read all the time that it is vital for a horse to have a solid foundation. I, along with many others, have written articles explaining just what a solid foundation is, and how important it is for a horse to understand in order to progress into more difficult and advanced maneuvers. What I think that we leave out in this equation is the importance of the riders understanding of the foundation. If more riders had a solid foundation there would be a lot less confusion and misunderstanding when it comes to the advanced maneuvers.

First, we have to understand how we teach the foundation to the horse which is exactly the same way that we teach the rider a solid foundation. I teach a horse the basics by repetition and consistency. From the first day a horse comes into training, (assuming that it is already able to be ridden ) my leg pressure on his right side means to move away from this pressure to the left. This does not change in any way from day one to the last day that I ride him. The more that we practice this the better and more consistent the horse gets.

This concept is the same for the rider. If you practice your riding once a week for twenty minutes, do not expect to become proficient at riding for quite a long time. Nor should you expect for yourself to become familiar with how to use your legs, or strengthen your legs, much less become comfortable using your legs while trying to become comfortable sitting in a saddle. Many riders have to understand that your basics or foundation as a rider is just as important as the foundation that your horse has. This is why so many trainers say that it is best that a first time rider purchases a horse that is more advanced. This is the same reason that you would send your horse to be trained by someone who is more advanced. Someone has to know what they are doing in order to learn.

Population, dynamics, ethics, and policy

Writers Handbook

The Writer's Handbook 2004

English mechanic and world of science, with which are incorporated "the Mechanic", "Scientific opinion," and the "British and foreign mechanic."

Village viability in contemporary society